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ABSTRACT
Increased health care spending has been argued to be largely due to technological change.  Cost-effectiveness
analysis is the main tool used by private and public third-party payers to prioritize adoption of the
new technologies responsible for this growth.  However, such analysis by payers invariably reflects
prices set by producers rather than resources used to produce treatments.  This implies that the “costs”
in cost-effectiveness assessments depend on endogenous markups which are, in turn, influenced by
demand factors of patients, doctors, and payers. Reimbursement policy based on endogenous cost-effectiveness
levels may therefore bear little relationship to efficient use of scarce medical resources. Using data
on technology appraisals in the United Kingdom, we test for conditions under which adoption based
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New medical technologies are often argued to be a leading force behind the 
growth in health care spending.
1  In order to manage the costs imposed by such 
technologies and to prioritize health care dollars, both public and private payers have 
increasingly demanded evidence on combined measures of the benefits and costs of new 
technologies. These measures include cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, and cost-benefit 
analysis, hereafter referred to collectively as CE analysis.
2  It is self-evident that payers 
should attempt to maximize the returns in health they obtain from the limited resources 
available for health spending.  CE analysis is the main method used for this purpose.
3  
For example, CE thresholds, which dictate that a given technology will be reimbursed 
only if costs per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) are below a given threshold, is one 
way in which CE-based adoption is implemented in practice.  The most prominent 
examples are the United Kingdom (UK) National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) and Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee.
4  A s  a  
consequence of the extensive use of CE analysis by payers, an enormous health 
economics literature has developed and shown the conditions under which CE analysis, 
when applied under a fixed budget constraint, can lead to gains in efficiency.  Indeed, the 
amount of work done on the CE of medical technologies may perhaps be the largest field 
within health economics, particularly in European countries where such analysis guides a 
large share of public technology adoption and reimbursement.  
When CE analysis is used to guide reimbursement in practice, however, the costs 
incorporated into these assessments are the prices charged to payers by producers or 
innovators, rather than the societal resource costs used in production.  This is almost 
inevitable as producers in any industry are never eager to share their data on production 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Newhouse (1992) and recent summary by Chandra and Skinner (2008). 
2 The literature on these methods is vast, but for examples, see Weinstein and Stason (1977), Johanneson  
and Weinstein (1993), Gold et al. (1996), Meltzer (1997), Drummond et al. (1997), Garber (2000). 
3 Building on the area-variations literature, others have suggested that cost-effectiveness analysis of 
‘accountable care organizations’ rather than of specific treatments may be efficient (Chandra, Fisher, and 
Skinner; 2010). 
4 Bethan et al. (2001) report on Australia. While prior to 1993 no European countries formally required 
pharmacoeconomic assessments of new products (Drummond et al., 1993), most of the 13 European 
countries evaluated in a later analysis (Drummond , 1999) had or were in the process of developing formal 
agencies responsible for such assessments. 4 
 
costs.  Therefore, prices – marked up over costs – determine the CE levels observed for 
new innovations, not the production costs which ordinarily determine the efficient use of 
resources.   
This paper examines how using prices rather than costs impacts the usefulness of 
CE analysis in guiding health care resource allocation. When prices impact the likelihood 
of technology adoption and are chosen to maximize expected profits given this 
uncertainty, observed CE levels will be endogenous. They will be determined by firms’ 
incentives to mark up technologies above their production costs, which will in turn 
depend on how CE analysis is used in reimbursement.  For example, if a third-party only 
pays for technologies that are cheaper than a fixed CE threshold, as done in the UK, 
manufacturers may find it in their best interest to price up to that threshold regardless of 
production costs.  Treatments may appear equally cost-effective due to the adoption 
policy of the payer, despite varying greatly in the extent to which patients are willing to 
pay above production costs. More generally, demand-side factors that drive markups also 
drive observed CE levels.  In fact, because producers face two customers, payers 
adopting the technologies and patients or doctors using them, we show that the price-
sensitivity of both parties jointly determines the markup. In short, observed CE levels 
will depend on how CE assessments are used in technology adoption. The traditional 
“bang-for-the-buck” rationale for CE policies may therefore fail because demand factors 
are included in the “buck”.  The overall argument of this paper, therefore, is that the 
rationale for using CE assessments for health care adoption is weakened when those 
affected by such adoption policies act in their own self-interest.   
Section 2 of this paper begins by deriving a specific condition for when CE 
rankings of treatments based on endogenous measures will deliver different rankings than 
when based on exogenous production costs – we term this a ‘reversal.’  The possibility of 
such reversals is central to understanding whether the use of CE analysis by payers will 
lead to efficient adoption (or not) of technologies with the largest health impacts and the 
cheapest production costs.  Reversals occur when markups are negatively related with 
production costs so that treatments with the lowest resource use are also those marked up 
the most. We characterize what drives markups in a non-standard environment of dual 
demand by patients/doctors and payers.  In particular, we show how public CE-based 5 
 
reimbursement policies drive markups in conjunction with patient demand, and hence 
determine the level of endogenous cost-effectiveness chosen by firms seeking 
reimbursement.  We argue that a central issue affecting reversals is whether there is 
heterogeneity across treatments in the adoption behavior of payers.   
Section 3 proposes a simple test whether existing adoption policies may lead to 
CE reversals based on a simple heterogeneity test.  Regressing adoption decisions on 
observed endogenous CE levels and a set of covariates, in our case  disease-class 
dummies, we argue that a simple F-test  indicates the possibility of reversals.  Using data 
on treatment adoption decisions by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom from 1999 to 2005, we find evidence 
suggestive of the possibility of such reversals.  
Lastly, we conclude in Section 4 by discussing several shortcomings of the paper 
and some of the  future research areas they suggest. 
 
2. Exogenous versus Endogenous Cost-Effectiveness  
This section derives the relationship between exogenous cost-effectiveness, which 
depends on exogenous resource costs of production, and endogenous cost-effectiveness, 
which relies on prices faced by payers.   
 
2.1 Basic Framework  
We interpret cost-effectiveness determination in a standard quantity-quality 
framework of a monopolist. Consider a single treatment that provides an exogenous, 
homogenous incremental benefit in health q over a baseline treatment.  The treatment is 
assumed to be produced by a monopolist who charges an incremental price p.  The health 
benefit q may be the incremental extension in quality-adjusted life years due to treatment 
(as perhaps revealed by data from clinical trials) and can generally be interpreted in 
standard economic formulations as the quality of the product.  Compared to a baseline 
treatment, we assume there is a constant marginal cost c(q) of producing a treatment of a 
given quality level. 
In this framework, we define the exogenous incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 




CE           ( 1 )  
The numerator is the exogenously determined incremental resource cost to society per 
person utilizing treatment, and the denominator is the incremental health benefit among 
those utilizing treatment.  In the Appendix, we discuss the conditions under which this is 
consistent with traditional static efficiency criteria.
5  
The endogenous cost-effectiveness ratio uses the price faced by payers as the 




CEN           ( 2 )  
If m denotes the markup above costs, it is defined as p = m·c.  It follows immediately that 
the two forms of cost-effectiveness are related by:     
CE m CEN          ( 3 )  
This implies that resource allocation decisions based on endogenous cost-effectiveness 
may be inefficient even when exogenous cost-effectiveness analysis would deliver 
efficient resource allocation. In particular, treatment adoption based on endogenous CE 
may lead to the selection of less cost-effective treatments in terms of resource costs.  We 
discuss conditions under which the two norms of cost-effectiveness involve “reversals” in 
the sense that  
N N CE CE CE CE ' & '         ( 4 )  
    
Such CE-reversals, or equivalently in the other direction, amount to changes in the 
ranking of CE levels from best to worst. These reversals occur when the offsetting 






          ( 5 )    
                                                 
5 Jena and Philipson (2009) discuss the inefficiencies implied by using a static efficiency criterion such as 
cost-effectiveness to guide technology adoption.  Static criteria measure consumer benefits relative to costs 
and take innovation as given. To maximize dynamic efficiency, it may be desirable to lower cost-
effectiveness levels that raise producer surplus and thus incentives to innovate.   
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This takes place when markups are negatively related to production costs so that low-cost 
treatments are marked up relatively more.  For example, compared to medical devices, 
drugs may have smaller marginal costs of production yet face larger markups due to 
inelastic demand or patent protection.  
  
2.2 Expected profit maximization and cost-effectiveness levels  
  As the markup of prices over costs is the key determinant of the concordance 
between endogenous and exogenous CE, it is important to understand what drives 
markups. When there are third-party payers, such as private- or public insurers, markups 
are non-standard as producers face two demand sides; the payer adopting the treatment 
and the patients or doctors using it.  The price-sensitivity of both sets of customers will 
affect pricing.    
More precisely, if the demand price (patient cost-sharing) is given by s(p) for a given 
price, then the quantity demanded D(s(p),q) falls in the demand price and rises with 
quality.  If the technology is adopted by the payer, the producer collects the variable 
profit induced by the pricing, but if it is not adopted he earns no profits.  Let the 
probability of adoption be denoted A(p,q) given the price and quality. We assume it is 
differentiable and decreasing function of price but an increasing function of quality.  A 
special case would be when the chance of coverage is decreasing in the endogenous cost-
effectiveness ratio of the technology, i.e. A(p,q)≡ A(p/q).  Thus, both forms of demand 
depend negatively on price (“cost”) and positively on quality (“effectiveness”).
6   
  Given the two components of demand, the expected profits are the post-approval 
profits discounted by the probability of treatment adoption: 
 
) ( ) ( )] ( )[ ), ( ( ) , ( max ] [ p p A q c p q p s D q p A E
p
          (6) 
Throughout, we treat quality as exogenous and previously determined before the pricing 
decision and often suppress it to limit notation. We assume that the probability of 
acceptance and ex-post profits are well-behaved in the sense that A(p) is differentiable 
                                                 
6 For example, when the binary demand of the payer is determined by an unknown reservation price R 
(“CE-threshold”) distributed according to the cdf denoted G(r;q), the acceptance function is given by 
A(p,q)=Pr(r>p)=1-G(p;q). 8 
 
and strictly decreasing and π(p) is differentiable, concave, and has a unique profit-
maximizing price.  
The probability of technology adoption, the variable profits conditional on 
reimbursement, and the expected profits are illustrated in the figure below. 
 
FIGURE 1—Probability of treatment adoption, variable and expected profits 
 
These expected profits imply that in raising price, the producer must take into account 
two types of buyers—the third-party payer making the treatment adoption decision and 
the patients or providers using the product once adopted. The optimal price balances the 
profit impacts of the two demand sides and interior price satisfies the necessary first-
order condition: 
  0 ' '     A A          ( 7 )  
The gain in profits conditional on adoption at a higher price must be balanced with the 
larger chance of not being adopted.  Throughout we assume there is a unique optimal 
price.
7 
This optimal balance between adoption and ex-post profits has two direct 
implications. First, producers will not set price low enough to guarantee acceptance since 
                                                 
7 A sufficient condition for a unique optimum is that A’(0)=0 and that -A’/A is increasing in price. Then 
there is a unique price at which the increasing function –A’/A crosses the function π’/ π which is decreasing 








Adoption Probability  Profits 9 
 
the probability of rejection, 1-A, is strictly positive at the optimal positive price.   
Producers take the risk of rejection in exchange for the larger profits obtained when the 
submitted treatment is adopted.  Second, the price that maximizes expected profits (Aπ) is 
lower than the price that maximizes standard profits conditional on reimbursement (π).  
This follows from the fact that the first-order condition can be restated as   
0 ) / ' ( '      A A  so that the ex-ante optimal price is on the upward sloping part of the 
inverted U-shaped profit function π in Figure 1.  Intuitively, pricing above the ex-post 
optimal price lowers both ex-post profits and the chance of approval and so can never be 
optimal. Producers do not necessarily raise price enough to maximize ex-post profits for 
fear of not getting the technology approved at such a high price.     
Rearranging the necessary first order condition, it can be written as a modified 
Lerner condition for the optimal percentage markup as in:
8 
(p-c)/p = 1/[εD + εA]         ( 8 )  
where εA =-A’p/A and εD =-Dpp/D are the absolute values of the price-elasticities of the 
two forms of demand.  This generalized markup condition has several implications.  First, 
the markup falls with the price-sensitivity of both forms of demand. Under one extreme, 
if there is no impact of raising price on approval then εA = 0 and the markup satisfies the 
standard Lerner condition of ex-post profits. Hence, the price sensitivity of the approval 
decision lowers markups below the standard level.  On the other extreme, if there is no 
impact of price on ex-post demand, as may be the case when demand prices or co-pays 
do not vary the supply price, then εD = 0 and the price is governed by adoption behavior 
alone. For example, public payers may differentially adopt treatments based on the 
severity or prevalence of a disease.  Alternatively, certain diseases may have more 
politically influential interest groups (e.g. HIV/AIDS or breast cancer in the US) and 
therefore face easier approval.   
  A second implication of this generalized Lerner condition is that pricing may 
occur where ex-post demand by patients/doctors is inelastic. That would never occur 
under standard profit-maximization, since raising price would raise ex-post profits by 
                                                 
8 The FOC may written as εA=( π’*p)/π and  (π’*p)/π=([Dp(p-c) + D]*p)/(D*(p-c))=-εD + p/(p-c). 
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increasing revenue and reducing total costs. However, such a rise in ex-post profits on the 
margin may be optimal when it traded off against the lower chance of reimbursement.    
The final and most important implication of the Lerner condition is that if both 
demand sides affect markups, differences between observed endogenous cost-
effectiveness rankings and unobserved exogenous rankings may occur.  In particular, the 
two cost-effectiveness levels are related according to:   
CEN=CE/[1-1/(εD + εA) ]        ( 9 )  
As a consequence, when demand elasticities counteract cost differences, selecting 
treatments based on endogenous cost-effectiveness will lead to adoption behavior that 
selects  treatments that do not deliver the largest health benefits for a given amount of 
resources used to produce them.   
 
Section 3:  Causes of reversals in cost-effectiveness 
In this section, we discuss factors that lead to the selection of inefficient 
treatments when adoption is based on endogenous cost-effectiveness levels rather than 
exogenous ones.  Given that demand behavior reflects the difference between the two 
forms of CE as indicated in (9), of central importance is demand heterogeneity across 
treatments with similar exogenous cost-effectiveness levels.   
Generally, for a given demand or supply factor represented by the scalar z, the 
price for a given quality level may depend on both demand and supply conditions as in:
9  
  p(q,z)  =  m(q,z)c(q,z)        (10) 
If the two cost-effectiveness measures are denoted by CE(q,z) = c(q,z)/q and CEN(q,z) = 
p(q,z)/q, then a sufficient condition for reversals to occur is that an increase in the factor 
has opposing effects on CE measures:  





        ( 1 1 )     
This condition can be rewritten as:    
 [µ m + µc][µc]   <   0         ( 1 2 )      
                                                 
9 For example, under expected profit maximization the parameters (z1,z2,z3) may reflect acceptance-, patient 
demand-, and cost parameters  in the expected profits V=A(p;z1)[D(p,q;z2)(p-c(q;z3))].      11 
 
where µm = mz*z/m and µc = cz*z/c are the markup and cost elasticities with respect to the 
factor z.  If the factor raises costs, µc > 0, then it raises exogenous cost effectiveness CE. 
But if the factor lowers markups more than it raises costs, µ m + µc < 0, then the factor 
lowers endogenous cost-effectiveness CEN as it is the product of the two.   
 
3.1 Reversals due to differential demand behavior   
If two treatments have the same production costs and quality they have the same 
exogenous cost-effectiveness, CE. However, if the two treatments differ in either forms 
of demand, i.e. approval by a third-party or ex-post demand by patients and providers, 
then they may have different levels of endogenous cost-effectiveness.   
 
3.1.1 Reversals due to differential patient and doctor demand behavior   
First consider the extreme case when all treatments are adopted by the payer, 
A=1, regardless of their cost-effectiveness. This is arguably the case in the US where 
FDA approval of a technology is sufficient for coverage by the public payers Medicare 
and Medicaid.  In this setting, expected profits Aπ reduce to post-approval profits and 
optimal pricing satisfies the standard condition; π’=0.  In this standard case of markup 
determination, the elasticity of patient or doctor demand yields the markup:  
  m = 1/(1-1/εD)         ( 1 3 )  
Therefore, reversals may occur when the lower costs treatments are also the most 
inelastically demanded by patients or doctors.  In particular, a negative relationship 
between markups and costs of production may occur when low cost treatments are 
produced in less competitive markets or when low cost treatments such as 
pharmaceuticals are more marked up than devices or surgery.  
 
3.1.2 Reversals due to differential adoption behavior   
As an illustration, consider when public payers follow a reservation price policy, 
adopting only treatments priced below the reservation price.  In the UK, this is often 
described as a “CE-threshold” policy in which only technologies whose CE levels are 
below a given threshold T are adopted;  A(p/q) =0  if p/q > T and A(p/q) = 1 if p/q ≤ T.  
Furthermore, suppose cost-sharing has no variable component, as might be true if there is 12 
 
a fixed payment for filling a given prescription, s(p) = s.  In this case, as both demand 
elasticities are zero below the threshold (εD = εA =0), optimal pricing would lead to the 
endogenous CE set to the threshold. This would, in turn, induce markups that are 
inversely related to the exogenous CE levels:                                     
                            CEN = T   m·CE = T   m = T/CE 
The adoption rule therefore induces markups that are negatively related to resource costs.  
Because of this negative relationship, changes in real resource use – as reflected by 
exogenous CE levels – would have no impact on endogenous levels of CE used for 
payment purposes.
10   
 
3.1.3 Reversals due to differential adoption and production costs  
If two treatments differ only in costs but are of equal quality then there is a 
reversal whenever price is lower for the more expensive treatment
11 
  c  <  c’  &  p  >  p’     
In this case, the factor z shifts both the cost c(q;z) but also the markup m(q;z) because 
markups cannot be constant (constant elasticity) when A is bounded. The effect on cost 
differences is illustrated in Figure 3. Among treatments of the same quality, this figure 
shows two curves that map out the optimal price of a treatment as an increasing function 
of the treatment’s exogenous CE level where the slope is affected by the endogenous 
markup.   
 
FIGURE 3—Reversals due to adoption and cost-differences across treatments  
                                                 
10 This is, of course, true as long as exogenous CE levels are not higher than the threshold, in which case 
the technology would presumably not be presented to the payer for adoption in the first place. 
11 It may appear that the two forms of cost-effectiveness yields the same ranking of treatments differing in 
costs when both forms of demand are of constant elasticity. However, the bounded function A cannot be of 
constant elasticity throughout its support.   13 
 
 
Holding quality constant, the x-axis corresponds both to different cost levels and 
exogenous CE levels. The top line traces out the profit-maximizing price charged by a 
firm whose product treats a disease that has a high probability of public adoption at any 
given level of submitted cost-effectiveness.  Similarly, the lower line characterizes the 
optimal price for treatments in disease classes that are less favorably adopted.  Now, 
consider two treatments of differing costs of production, cL < cH.  For a given cost level, 
it is clear that the price will be higher in the higher approval class; that is, pL < pH for the 
same cost level cL.  This directly implies a change in rankings from treatments having the 
same exogenous CE to having strictly different endogenous CE levels. In addition, full 
reversals may occur when politically motivated adoption behavior is negatively related to 
resource costs. For example, suppose a treatment is more expensive to produce and is in 
the low acceptance disease class; the profit-maximizing price is pM.  If the lower-cost 
treatment is in the high acceptance class, then its profit-maximizing price is pH which is 
higher than pM.  In this case, a full reversal will occur when the lower-cost treatment – in 
a resource sense – is in a class that is less politically favored by the public payer. 
 
 3.2 Reversals due to differential quality 
Price 










When treatments vary in quality, reversals occur when quality raises one form of cost-
effectiveness while lowering the other:  





        ( 1 4 )     
This condition can be rewritten as 
 [µ m + µc -1][µc  - 1 ]   <   0            ( 1 5 )  
where µm and µc are the elasticities of markups and costs with respect to quality.  If costs 
alone do not rise as fast as quality, µ c<1, then exogenous cost-effectiveness CE falls with 
quality.  But if markups and costs together rise as fast as quality, µ m + µc > 1, then 
endogenous cost-effectiveness CEN rises with quality.  Thus, markups and costs may both 
rise in the same direction with quality, yet still lead to reversals in endogenous and 
exogenous cost-effectiveness. Similarly, costs may rise faster than quality when quality 
rises, µc >1, while markups fall in quality enough so that prices do not rise as fast as 
quality, µ m + µc  < 1.    
 
3.3 Generalizing to other payer and demand environments 
  Our analysis can be generalized to broader objective functions of producers in 
environments with many different payers and patient/doctor demand structures.  In reality 
and more generally, treatment adoption decisions involve multiple payers, disease 
indications, patient groups, and doctor groups that are linked to each other by price. 
Suppose profits to producers are represented by the general function V(p,q;z) 
where z is a set of parameters that describes the payer and demand environment. When 
there is a single payer, the expected profits discussed earlier may be written as:    
V(p,q,z) = A(p;z1)[D(p,q;z2)(p-c(q;z3))]        (15)      
Now suppose that there are multiple payers involved, denoted by k = 1, 2,.., K, each with 
different approval behavior and possibly ex-post profits to the producer. In this case, the 
general profit function may be written:   
V(p,q;z) = F[A1(p;z),π1(p;z),… . ,AK(p;z),πK(p;z)]    (16)   
For a general profit function V, reversals driven by demand conditions will occur as long 
as the endogenously chosen price is affected by demand conditions, holding costs of 
production constant. Because this is nearly always true, reversals will be likely under 15 
 
those general conditions as well.  More precisely, for the general profit-function the 
necessary FOC determining the optimal price satisfies:    
0 ) ; , (  z q p
dp
dV
        ( 1 7 )     
If z is a scalar demand parameter, then the implicit function theorem directly implies it 













       ( 1 8 )  
If the SOC is satisfied then the denominator is non-zero and dp/dz will be non-zero 
whenever d
2V/dpdz is non-zero.  In other words, if the FOC is shifted by the demand 
parameter z, so that d
2V/dpdz is non-zero, then dp/dz will be non-zero as well.  This 
implies that in order to check for the potential possibility of cost-effectiveness reversals, 
one need only check for heterogeneity in a demand parameter that has a non-zero cross 
partial for the profit function V.  For example, when there is a single payer which induces 
the profit function (15) and heterogeneity in factors affecting the probability of adoption 
(e.g. z1 reflecting preference towards treatments for diseases with larger influence on the 
political process), reversals will occur because the partial dV/dpdz = (Apz1)(D*(p-c)) + 
(Az1)[Dp*(p-c) + D)] is generally non-zero. 
 
4. Testing for heterogeneity in adoption behavior: an analysis of NICE 
Heterogeneity in adoption policies across types of treatments (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals vs. devices vs. procedures) or disease classes is a sufficient condition for 
reversals to occur. Using data on treatment adoption decisions by the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, this section discusses 
tests for such heterogeneity in adoption behavior. Co-pays in the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS) do not depend on producer prices so that the relationship between the two 
forms of cost effectiveness becomes is driven by approval behavior CEN = CE/[1-1/εA]. 
Thus, our tests for approval heterogeneity may be interpreted as sufficient conditions for 
reversals in the context of NICE.     
 
3.1 Background on NICE  16 
 
Introduced in 1999 as a special health authority for England and Wales, the initial 
purview of NICE was to make recommendations to the British National Health Service 
(NHS) on the coverage of selected new and existing medical technologies and to develop 
clinical guidelines (Buxton, 2001).  Although other countries have developed similar 
organizations, NICE was the first national agency with the power to guide technology 
adoption for all new health technologies including pharmaceuticals, procedures, and 
devices (Schulper et al., 2001).  While NHS authorities were initially mandated to take 
into account but not necessarily follow NICE’s advice, in 2002 they became legally 
obligated to fund treatments recommended by NICE.  The initial spectrum of assessments 
by NICE included pharmaceuticals, medical devices, procedures, diagnostic and 
screening technologies, and health promotion programs, but most referrals to date have 
concerned either pharmaceuticals or devices.   
Following the selection of technologies to be assessed, NICE commissions or 
accepts reports from several sources, including the supply side (manufacturers), the 
demand side (professional and patients’ groups), and independent sources (academics). 
The evidence typically gathered for a given technology includes its clinical effectiveness, 
cost per quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) gained, and impact on costs borne by the 
NHS (Raftery, 2001).  After gathering this information, NICE first issues a provisional 
appraisal, which is reviewed by the parties involved, followed by a final appraisal to the 
NHS.  According to guidelines set forth by the Secretary of State for Health, the final 
guidance rendered by NICE should account for the clinical priorities of the NHS, the 
need of patients under consideration, the cost-effectiveness of the treatment, and the 
strength of clinical evidence and cost-effectiveness estimates (Buxton, 2001).  
The final guidance issued by NICE summarizes whether a treatment is 
recommended to the NHS and the reasoning behind the decision.  The appraisal 
committee makes one of four recommendations: the technology can be recommended 
with no restrictions, recommended with minor restrictions, recommended with major 
restrictions, or not recommended.  If a manufacturer is unsatisfied with the 
recommendation, it can appeal the decision. 
 
3.2 Data on technology approvals by NICE 17 
 
Since its inception in 1999, NICE has published 141 guidances.  Our data 
analyzes the 86 guidances submitted to NICE between the years 1999 and 2005—the 
dates of guidance publication range from 2001 to 2007.
12  We define a particular 
treatment as each combination of a drug or technology and the disease it addresses.  Since 
the same drug or technology may be used to treat multiple diseases or the drug or 
technology may have different parts that must be recommended separately, a single 
guidance may contain multiple treatments.  Our database, therefore, has 145 treatments in 
the 86 guidances we examine, and the unit of observation is a treatment.  Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics on these guidances in terms of endogenous CE levels (p/q) 
as well as acceptance behavior (A). 
TABLE 1—Descriptive statistics of NICE guidance data 
Total no. of guidances  145     
Treatments recommended by NICE  Percent     
 Yes  30     
  Yes, with minor restrictions  32     
  Yes, with major restrictions  22     
 No  16     
No. of guidances with published CE  76     
Endogenous CE  (Cost per QALY (£))  by 





 Low  estimate  35  12,297  11,704 
 High  estimate  37  43,673  35,701 
 Mean  estimate  51  28,132  18,798 
Endogenous CE (Cost per LYG (£) ) by range 
of estimate       
 Low  estimate  20 8,276  6,304 
 High  estimate  22  19,506  13,744 
 Mean  estimate  26  17,397  11,404 
Avg. of est. mean cost per QALY or LYG (£)  76  24,710  17,380 
Range of est. mean cost per QALY or LYG Percent    
  Less than £10,000  22     
  Between £10,000 and £20,000  25     
  Between £20,000 and £30,000  18     
                                                 
12 We are thankful to James Raftery for providing us with his detailed collection of these guidances.  We do 
not have data on guidances submitted after 2005, which compromise the remainder of the 141 guidances 
noted above. 18 
 
  Between £30,000 and £40,000  16     
  More than £40,000  18     
Source: NICE published treatment guidances, 1999 – 2005. 
 
Of the 145 NICE guidances present in our data, 23 (16%) were not recommended by 
NICE, 32 (22%) were recommended with major restrictions, 46 (32%) were 
recommended with minor restrictions, and 44 (30%) were recommended with no 
restrictions.  A “no” recommendation is given for either poor cost-effectiveness or 
insufficient evidence to warrant the use of the treatment.  While treatments with major 
restrictions are still recommended by NICE, such treatments are only recommended for 
either second-line use by those refractory to alternative treatments or by targeted 
subgroups with severe disease.  Recommendations with minor restrictions limit use in 
one of several ways; e.g. recommendations may require the particular treatment to be the 
least costly option, may require specialist supervision, or may require treatment 
monitoring.  The treatments that are recommended as “yes” without any restrictions can 
be used routinely and as the primary treatment for a disease.  Overall, 84% of treatments 
included in our data were recommended with no, minor, or major restrictions. 
  For those guidances for which cost-effectiveness is reported
13, NICE measures 
cost-effectiveness in two ways, cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained and 
cost per life year (LY) gained, both measured relative to some baseline treatment.   
Quality-adjusted life years differ from life years gained by incorporating both quality and 
quantity of life into measures of a treatment’s effectiveness.  Cost-effectiveness ratios are 
calculated in the usual manner.
14 
Because measuring effectiveness precisely can be difficult, NICE guidances often 
report high, mean, and low estimates of cost per quality-adjusted life year or standard life 
year gained for each treatment.  For those treatments for which high and low estimates 
exist, Table 1 presents the average cost per QALY or LY gained within each range.  The 
                                                 
13 As shown in Table 1, NICE does not always report cost-effectiveness for each treatment so estimates 
only exist for roughly half (76/145) of the observations in our data.   
14 For example, if a new drug costs £15,000 and the existing treatment costs £5,000, the numerator in the 
cost per QALY (or LY) gained measurement is £10,000.  If the new treatment adds 0.9 QALYs and the 
previous treatment added 0.4 QALYs, the denominator is 0.5 QALYs.  Therefore, the cost per QALY is 
£10,000/0.5 = £20,000. 19 
 
within-treatment variability is substantial—the estimates of average cost per QALY or 
LY gained vary from roughly £12,000 (low-estimate group) to £44,000 (high estimate 
group) in our data.   
In order to have a unified cost-effectiveness measure for our subsequent analysis, 
we do not distinguish between QALYs and standard LYs and assume that the cost per 
QALY or LY gained takes on either the mean cost per QALY gained or mean cost per 
LY gained, depending on which variable exists for a given treatment.  Under this 
measure, the mean cost per QALY or LY gained is approximately £24,710 with a 
standard deviation of £17,380. 
 
 
3.3 Heterogeneity and endogeneity bias 
 
Our theoretical analysis implies that heterogeneity in treatment adoption across 
either treatment types or disease classes is central to reversals. However, estimating the 
impact of observed cost-effectiveness on the probability of adoption is hampered by the 
fact that adoption and observed cost-effectiveness levels are endogenously determined.. 
To illustrate the implications of this endogeneity bias, consider two treatments; the first is 
adopted with certainty (A=1) and the second is adopted with some probability that 
depends negatively on the submitted cost-effectiveness level (A’<0).  This would lead to 
an ex-post optimal monopoly price for the first treatment but a lower price for the second 
one. Acceptance would therefore be high for the first treatment with a high endogenous 
CE level but low for the second treatment with a low endogenous CE. Heterogeneity may 
therefore imply an unconditional positive relationship between adoption and endogenous 
CE even though the relationship is negative conditionally. More precisely, for two 
treatments with different adoption functions A1  and A2  that induce prices p(A1) > p( A2 ), 
it may well be true that A1 (p(A1)) <  A2 (p( A2 )).   A sufficient “diagnostic” test for the 
presence of heterogeneity in the case of NICE would therefore be an increasing 
relationship between adoption and endogenous CE levels as it would never be observed if 
the adoption-function A(.) was homogeneous and decreasing in endogenous CE levels 20 
 
across all treatments.  In this homogeneous case, the unconditional relationship between 
approval and endogenous CE would depict the homogenous function A.     
Table 1 discussed above provides information about this unconditional 
relationship in the data.  We group the mean cost per QALY or LY gained into five 
categories: less than £10,000, between £10,000 and £20,000, between £20,000 and 
£30,000, between £30,000 and £40,000, and more than £40,000.  The proportion of 
treatments within each range is fairly similar, with approximately 34% of treatments 
having cost-effectiveness levels above commonly reported thresholds of NICE adoption 
(~£30,000).  Using these data, Figure 4 plots the unconditional relationship between a 
treatment’s endogenous CE and the probability of NICE recommendation—the reduced 
form of the acceptance function A(p/q) in our analysis. The figure illustrates our 
diagnostic test of a non-monotonic relationship between endogenous CE and acceptance 
and is suggestive that heterogeneity in acceptance across treatments may be present.   
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Source: NICE published treatment guidances, 1999 – 2005. 
In addition, Figure 4 is also consistent with the discussed prediction that under uncertain 
adoption, optimal pricing will result in a strictly positive fraction of treatments being 
rejected as firms trade off higher ex-post profits due to higher prices with the increased 
probability of rejection that these higher prices induce.  
 
3.4 Heterogeneity and reversals: NICE adoption behavior by disease class 
Our analysis implies that differences in treatment adoption behavior across 
treatment types (pharmaceuticals vs devices vs procedures) or disease classes will induce 
reversals in CE rankings.  We test for heterogeneity in adoption behavior across disease 
classes; Table 2 specifies how the probability of acceptance of treatments by NICE has 
varied by disease class and endogenous cost-effectiveness levels.
15 
 
TABLE 2—Number of treatments submitted and accepted by disease class and 
endogenous cost-effectiveness, NICE 1999-2005 
 
  Endogenous Cost-effectiveness (1,000£/QALY) 
Disease Class  < 20  20 - 40  >40  Total  % accepted 
Arthritis 5/5  2/2  0/1  8  88 
Cancer 14/14  8/9  2/3  26  92 
Heart 7/7  4/4  0/0  11  100 
Infectious 2/2  2/5  2/5  12 50 
Mental 4/5  1/2  0/1  8  63 
Prevention 2/2  2/2  0/0  4  100 
Other 3/3  2/2  2/2  7  100 
Total   38  26  12  76  84 
% accepted  97  81  50  84   
Source: NICE published treatment guidances, 1999 – 2005.   
Each cell reports the number of accepted treatments/submitted 
treatments for a given disease class and endogenous cost-
effectiveness range. 
 
Table 2 first illustrates that the NICE guidances in our data span a relatively large group 
                                                 
15 Of course, an ideal empirical test of reversals would be to test how well exogenous and endogenous CE 
measures align by ranking treatments according to their exogenous and endogenous CE levels.  This is 
infeasible as markups are unobservable, a standard and central empirical problem in industrial organization 
more generally.  22 
 
of diseases and categories of treatment.  Of the 76 guidances considered, 26 (34%) were 
for cancer, 11 (14%) were for heart disease, 12 (16%) were for infectious disease, 8 
(11%) were for mental health, and so on.  Next, for a given range of cost-effectiveness 
(columns), each row of Table 2 displays both the number of treatments accepted by and 
submitted to NICE for a given disease.  For example, out of 14 treatments for cancer with 
submitted CE levels below 20,000 £/QALY, 14 were accepted by NICE with minor, 
major, or no restrictions.  For cancer treatments with submitted CE levels in the range of 
20,000 – 40,000 £/QALY, 8 out of 9 treatments were adopted by NICE, while in the 
range of 40,000 £/QALY and above, 2 of 3 submitted treatments were accepted.   
Importantly, however, in the same ranges of 20,000 – 40,000 £/QALY and greater than 
40,000 £/QALY, respectively, 2 out of 5 treatments for infectious disease were accepted.  
In the same respective ranges, 1 out of 2 and 0 out of 1 submitted treatments for mental 
health were accepted.  This table suggests that differential adoption behavior by NICE 
towards specific diseases may exist.  This should, of course, be qualified by the power 
issues that are present—the data at hand are clearly limited by the number of guidances 
issued to date and the broad range of diseases covered. 
  The data in Table 2 suggest a general methodology to test for the potential of CE 
reversals, namely by testing whether the probability of treatment acceptance depends not 
only on submitted cost-effectiveness, but on the disease class of the treatment as well.  
Table 3 specifies such a test and reports the coefficients of a linear probability model of 
the impact of cost-effectiveness and disease class on the probability of treatment 
acceptance by NICE.  The linear probability model was selected due to well-known 
problems with logit or probit specifications in fitting the full acceptance levels displayed 
in the descriptive table. While sample size considerations prohibit a fully interacted 
model of the differential impact of disease class on the CE-adoption relationship, our 
model employs indicators for disease classes to determine how and whether specific 
disease classes affects the probability of adoption, conditional on endogenous CE levels.  
The excluded disease class was the smallest class, diabetes.  A necessary implication of a 
homogeneous acceptance function A across disease classes is that the dummies have no 





TABLE 3—Impact of endogenous cost-effectiveness and disease class on probability of 
treatment acceptance 
 
Probability of treatment acceptance    















2  0.38 
F-test of equality of disease indicators  p = 0.03 
Source: NICE published treatment guidances, 1999 – 
2005.  Table presents coefficients of a linear 
probability model of the impact of cost-effectiveness 
and disease class (excluded class: diabetes) on the 
probability of treatment adoption by NICE.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 
Table 3 demonstrates a statistically significant negative relationship between endogenous 
cost-effectiveness and the probability of treatment acceptance; the probability of 
acceptance declines by an estimated 0.009 (s.e. 0.002) for every 1,000 £/QALY increase 
in the submitted CE level.  In addition, compared to the excluded class of diabetes, each 
of the diseases presented in Table 3 has a lower estimated probability of acceptance, with 
infectious disease and mental health being the only diseases with statistically significant 
effects (-0.322 (s.e. 0.120) and -0.310 (s.e. 0.132), respectively).  This suggests the 
possibility of heterogeneity in treatment acceptance across disease classes, holding 
submitted CE constant.   
The existence of the possibility of reversals therefore boils down to testing 24 
 
whether there are class differences in adoption behavior, which can be succinctly 
summarized by an F-test of whether the coefficients on the disease-dummies are the 
same.  An F-test of the equality of disease dummies, in fact, rejects the null hypothesis 
that adoption behavior is identical across disease classes (p = 0.03). 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examined the efficiency implications of CE-based technology adoption 
in the presence of optimal pricing by firms. Such pricing implies that observed cost-
effectiveness levels are endogenous to the CE criteria used to guide payer adoption 
decisions.  Our main finding was that endogenous cost-effectiveness may not be a good 
guide to resource allocation and may not relate in a systematic way to exogenous 
measures that reflect true resource costs.  We showed that this may be important for 
threshold adoption policies commonly employed by NICE in the UK. This occurs 
because both patient/doctor demand factors and adoption policies determine prices but 
not resource costs. The end result is that the intended value of using CE analysis, to 
economize on resource costs used to deliver health care, may not be fulfilled.     
Our analysis has several important limitations that future research may 
successfully address.  First, one major identification issue facing any analyst is that actual 
production costs are unobservable to both econometricians and reimbursement 
authorities.  Endogenous CE rankings are observable while exogenous CE rankings are 
not.  The fact that markups are unobservable is, of course, well-known and long-
recognized in empirical industrial organization.  This issue led us to state our results as 
sufficient conditions for reversals across a distribution of treatments rather than as 
documented reversals in the sample at hand.  More work is needed to derive results that 
apply to a given sample of observed quality-, price- and demand data, such as those 
reflected in the NICE data analyzed here. 
Second, we did not consider the possibility of endogenous effectiveness or quality 
induced by technology adoption criteria.  This would be important when pricing affects 
effectiveness through demand.  For example, in the case of vaccines, lower prices lead to 
greater vaccination and socially beneficial “herd immunity”, thereby raising 
effectiveness.   Similar issues may arise for other links between demand and 25 
 
effectiveness, for instance “learning by doing” in the adoption of new technologies 
(Chandra and Staiger, 2007).   Reductions in price for a device used in surgery may lead 
to increased utilization, greater learning by doing, and ultimately increased effectiveness.  
The full endogeneity of both prices and effectiveness deserves further analysis in order to 
better understand the efficiency implications of cost-effectiveness based reimbursement.  
Adaptive cost-effectiveness adoption in which future prices are not restricted by initial 
launch prices may be an efficient method of dealing with both endogenous costs and 
effectiveness. 
Third, our analysis did not consider the implications for comparative effectiveness 
of multiple competing treatments.  Such an analysis would consider the duopoly and 
oligopoly pricing implications of making reimbursement decisions contingent on multiple 
industry prices and quality levels, as opposed to the single price and quality of a 
monopolist.  When setting prices, producers presumably take into account how 
reimbursement authorities use CE levels of competing treatments, e.g. through branded or 
generic reference pricing, for similar conditions.  The industrial organization of 
endogenous cost-effectiveness analysis, and its impact on health care spending, is an 
important area of future research. 
Fourth, we did not analyze how transparency of public decision-making affects 
cost-effectiveness reversals.  In our analysis of the NICE data, endogenous CE levels do 
not perfectly predict adoption decisions in the sense of goodness-of-fit.  This suggests 
that other unspecified political considerations affect adoption. Making such criteria 
explicit would lead to increased efficiency if producers did not waste development and 
application costs on rejected treatments.  This efficiency role of transparency needs to be 
better understood and can be assessed by the goodness-of-fit of the transparent criteria 
used in explaining payer adoption decisions.  
Lastly, the impact of endogenous innovation incentives needs to be better 
understood.  The work of Lakdawalla and Sood (2006, 2008) analyze the implications for 
innovation of the two-part pricing induced by insurance reimbursement with co-pays. The 
implications of payer reimbursement policies, such as those based on CEA, on 
appropriation by innovators is an important area of future research. 26 
 
 Despite these possible further implications of our analysis, however, we believe 
the overall concern that we raise deserves serious consideration in evaluating the gains 
from using CE analysis for efficient resource allocation. The overall point, that adoption 
policies may not have their intended efficiency effects when those affected by them act in 
their own interest, should feature more prominently into the design of future 
reimbursement systems and enable more appropriate growth in health care spending. 27 
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Relationship between social surplus and cost-effectiveness criteria 
 
Given the inverse demand function p(y,q) corresponding to the demand function d(p,q), 
the social surplus from an invention is given by: 
  ∫ [p(s,q)-c]ds = g - yc 
Here, the gross consumer surplus is denoted by g = ∫p(s,q)ds and the second term, yc, is 
the  total cost of production. Therefore, the social surplus is larger for one product over 
another if:  
  g - yc > g’- y’c’  
At equal quantities, y = y’, this is equivalent to:  
(g/y - g’/y’)/(c-c’) > 1 
where the numerator is the incremental gross surplus for the average individual.       
Treatment of quality q is incrementally more cost-effective than treatment of quality q’, 
i.e. (q-q’)/(c-c’) > 1,, whenever the average gross surplus equals the quality level:  
  g/y = q  
In other words, when quality levels represent average willingness to pay, the two criteria 
coincide. This may be interpreted as a cost-utility- or a willingness-to-pay criterion and 
previous analysis has analyzed the differences between these criteria at length. For 
example, standard justifications using $100,000 per quality adjusted life year as a 
threshold for payer adoption of technologies is based on the value of a healthy life-year 
of $100,000, g/y = $100,000, derived from empirical studies of labor markets or other 
tradeoffs between income and mortality.   
 
 
 